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Latin American experiences in balance-of-pay-
ments crises have been a rich source of insight into
the causes and results of such crises. Using the
Latin American backdrop, certain features of the
Asian crisis suggest that recovery can be more com-
plicated in Asia, though it might not necessarily be
more drawn out.
In recent memory we can distinguish between two
Latin American crises: the 1980s debt crisis and the
1994 Tequila crisis. In fact, Mexico's external pay-
ments problems served as the trigger to both.
Currently the Thais are trying to avoid a similar
reputation; early on, it had been suggested that
Asia crisis be called the 'Tom Yum' crisis.
The private-lending boom origin of the Latin
American Southern Cone crisis of 1981-83 shares
many of the features of the Tequila crisis. The 1994
Tequila crisis was characterised by a 'V-shaped' pat-
tern: drastic economic collapse followed by rapid
recovery The 1980s debt crisis manifested an 'L-
shaped' or 'extended' recovery pattern.
In the context of these two types of Latin American
crises, three factors create specific complications
for Asian economic recovery:
(1)Unlike the 1980's debt crisis, the locus of the
Asian crisis is not overwhelmingly in the public
sector, butin the private sector
(2)The Asian crisis is situated in the credit system,
with its inherent problems of rehabilitation and
recapitalisation plus vulnerability to currency
devaluation and instability
(3) In the Asian case a greater role is played by
internationalised asset markets arising from a
combination of liberalised capital accounts and
the impact of information-impelled movements
of large international funds.
* This is a heavily excised version of a paper presented at
the Forum on Currency and Financial Crises: Latin and
Asian Experiences and Lessons, 16 June 1998, ISEAS. I
take sole responsibility for all the facts and opinions in
this article and my interpretations do not necessarily
reflect the views or the policies of the Institute and its
supporters
1 Private, as Opposed to Public
Sector Locus
The 1980s international debt crisis was seen mainly
as a Latin American crisis, although one Asian
country the Philippines, and a few African coun-
tries were also involved. For Latin America, the
1980s debt crisis was a region-wide phenomenon
and lasted at least a decade.
The common elements in the 1980s debt crisis
were: large public sector investment-savings deficits
were feeding into unsustainable current account
deficits that were being financed by private interna-
tional bank lending; imports were subsequently
forced to contract in order to reconcile current
account deficits to the reduced external private will-
ingness to lend to these countries when the lending
frenzy stopped, thereby inflicting on them a
decade-long output contraction. Investment dried
up, public sector expenditure was cut back drasti-
cally, and the bulk of savings and consumption
compression went to pay interest on accumulated
foreign debt. The possibility of recovery only
emerged when significant chunks of the principal
were in effect written off through the Brady bond
discounts, beginning in 1988.
The debts that brought Latin America low for over
a decade were ultimately based on public sector
borrowing and when the debt crisis exploded even
those debts that had been incurred by the domestic
private sector were rapidly nationalised, either
through the operation of the government guaran-
tees or as an outcome of debt restructuring
negotiations.
The contrast with the Asian debt - and this is ironic
since the region had been reputed to be one where
the public sector had a strong and successful role in
development - is that the largest and most
In the case of the Mexican 1994 crisis, the debt had
been consolidated in the dollar denominated
government treasury bills, called tesobonos. Somehow,
before the crisis, the Asian private sector elicited more
credibility from international financiers than the Latin
one and a significant proportion of the lending was
made directly to private parties; many individual Asian
companies also floated bonds in developed country
markets. As it turns out, but as everyone who lent to
Asia should have known, bankruptcy procedures, even
where the laws are in place, do not operate at all in
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problematic debt in Asia was incurred by the
domestic private sector: banks, finance, companies
and corporations. In the case of Indonesia, a major-
ity of the external liabilities were undertaken
directly by corporations. The debt is in various
forms: credit lines, project financing, bonds.
The prevalence of the strategy of government-
guaranteed borrowing in the 1980s explains its per-
vasiveness; countries that did not undertake too
much of this type of borrowing escaped the crisis.
In the case of Asia, economies that did not partic-
ipate to the same extent in the external private bor-
rowing boom have also been affected through
currency depreciations.
Because of its private nature, it is more difficult to
consolidate the debt in Asia.' Thus, the debt work-
out is more complicated there. But it is not neces-
sarily the case that the debt workout will take
longer in Asia than it did in Latin America. The pro-
longation of the crisis in Latin America arose from
the unwillingness and initial inability of Western
deposit-money banks to recognise losses on devel-
oping country debt. This problem is still operating
at this time, but international players have a better
understanding that it is better for all involved to
recognise losses earlier rather than later. The debt
negotiations in Thailand, Korea and, lately,
Indonesia appear to embody this piece of wisdom
from 1980s.'
What about recovery? For both Latin America
during the 1980s and Asia during thel99Os the crit-
ical element is (1) the rehabilitation of the trade
credit system so that exports can restart and (2)
recovery of investment spending.
In the case of Latin America, the slowness to
recognise losses by foreign creditors was an impor-
tant factor in delaying recovery The restoration of
many instances. The fact that international bankruptcy
procedures are not in place either raises the question of
whether domestic bankruptcy procedures would be
sufficient anyway
2 However, the Asia debt adjustment is not necessarily
secure with the restructuring packages or systems now
in place. Further falls in the currency, further
widespread bankruptcies - which can be also caused by
further currency depreciations - and political upheavals
could cause an unravelling of these packages.
investment confidence in Latin America was
dependent also on the completion of the privatisa-
tion and liberalisation efforts that were put in place
through the accompanying structural adjustment
packages.
For Asia, the natural sluggishness in private-sector
debt workouts will be an important factor that will
slow down adjustment. This is not a problem only
of the Asian private sector; it is a problem of the pri-
vate sector everywhere. Private companies, espe-
cially their shareholders, tend to be slow in
recognising losses. This delays the sale of these
companies to other investors, who face the danger
of having to increase provisioning for unknown or
unforeseen liabilities in the assets they have
purchased.
Domestic banks are sitting on chunks of doubtful
claims. These losses have to be recognised as
rapidly as possible and could be either liquidated
by securitising them or consolidated into an asset
restructuring agency and securitised. Governments
are involved in this process (through the imposition
of provisioning rules and by the setting up of asset-
restructuring agencies), but the resistance of
domestic shareholders to recognise losses could
delay the liquidation. In the 1980s case when Latin
American countries were involved, it was usually
the government that was the shareholder of the
borrowing company.
Will the Asian crisis last a decade? I sincerely hope
not, and it is critical that the Asian private sectors
recognise their losses early
A complicating Asian factor is that a lot of potential
private sector losers are well-connected to the gov-
ernment. This is especially true in those countries
which the World Bank (1993) designated as being
in the group of 'miracle economies' because of good
governance,3 a key part of which was effective busi-
nessgovernment coordination. This suggests that
addressing the financial sector problem will at the
very least generate much political controversy and
recrimination. The use of taxpayers resources to bail
out favoured businessmen will in turn appeal to
governments that are likely to encourage the under-
taking of risky projects as the rationale for a
The Philippines was pointedly excluded from this
group.
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bail-out. At worst, these adjustments can lead to the
collapse of governments, even though such collapses
would more likely be the result of macroeconomic
events rather than bank restructuring policies.
Even in Indonesia, where there is a new president,
credit restructuring will be problematic. The new
president is not directly politically connected with
failing projects, but in the process of forcing write-
offs he will have to follow due process which will
entail investigations into parties associated with the
previous regime and awaiting the outcome of legal
proceedings. In the case of Japan, the intricate sys-
tem of determining primacy of claim from the pro-
ceeds of land sales is complicated by the possible
claims of criminal groups on loan proceeds.
Examples like this abound in the region.
2 The Credit System as Locus of
the Asian Problem
I use 'credit system' instead of 'financial system', since
direct borrowing by corporations, not just financial
institutions, constitutes a significant element in the
Asian crisis. Regulatory oversight of the banking sys-
tem and the finance companies (the latter proving to
be the Achilles heel of the system in Thailand and
Korea) was certainly not adequate. With liberalised
capital accounts, regulatory oversight was practically
non-existent in regard to the enormous direct exter-
nal borrowing by corporations, which was a key
ingredient in the Indonesian crisis.
The Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay)
crisis experience of 1981-83 has many of the ele-
ments of the Asian situation. In this experience, as
in Asia, a lending boom fuelled by external private
borrowing followed upon the rapid liberalisation of
the domestic financial system and the opening of
the capital account. The same elements were
observed in Norway, Sweden and Finland between
1988 and 1992, and before 1994 in Mexico.
Rehabilitating and recapitalising the credit system is
a more critical aspect of the Asian than the Latin
American case, where the locus of the domestic
credit aspect of the crisis was government corpora-
tions or government-owned banks. As pointed out
earlier, where there were domestic private parties
involved in the Latin American case, the credit
problems were rapidly socialised, with the govern-
ment taking over the liabilities. Closures and
privatisation of indebted government corporations
and banks were carried out in Latin America. To do
this, public sector labour unions had to be
appeased (or undermined) but when the corporate
adjustments were eventually carried out, normal
credit operations could theoretically restart. The
real constraint to the restart of investment was the
slow reflow of capital from external sources and
slow restoration of private investment confidence in
the light of the controversial structural reforms that
the countries were undertaking. Latin American
countries were having to put their public finances on
a sounder footing and liberalise their trade sectors.
In the case of the 1994 crisis, Mexico's bad debt
problem was quickly consolidated by an asset-
restructuring agency The extent of the resulting
reflow of capital into Mexico was so strong (some-
thing I discuss in the next section) that the matter
of financing the clean-up of this problem has been
postponed. This is now an issue for Mexico.
For Asia, the rehabilitation of the credit system and
how it is done is critical. I have already pointed out
above the problems inherent in the private sector
nature of the Asian crisis. Here I would like to focus
on the credit-centredness of the crisis. Credit reha-
bilitation and recovery require the recognition of
losses, their liquidation, and the recapitalisation of
credit institutions. For example, in Thailand, there
is an estimated recapitalisation requirement of $7.5
to $10 billion in the next three years.
In the Asian case, domestic savings rates are high
and, unlike in Latin America, the reflow of capital
from external sources is not a necessary ingredient
in credit rehabilitation and recovery for all coun-
tries. What is needed for credit rehabilitation and
recovery is a credible plan for adjustment and the
stabilisation of exchange rates.
In the Latin debt crisis of the 1980s, the US economy
was most of the time in the doldrums and could not
play the role of an engine of growth. the international,
mainly US, banks that had lent to Latin America were in
no position to absorb the write-offs implied by the crisis
when it began in 1982.
89
The current Malaysian case is a good illustration of
the kind of credit sector problems that did not have
to be faced in a significant way in Latin America. It
could be argued that Malaysia, as a nation, has
sufficient domestic resources to absorb the bad loan
write-offs. The proposal, not subsequently imple-
mented, for addressing the loan problems of the
controlling shareholder of the Malaysian Airways
System raised fears that Malaysia would undertake
a write-off process, thereby undermining business
confidence. If bad loans are transformed from being
liabilities of individuals to liabilities of corporations,
this would weaken the financial condition of the
corporate sector, potentially undermining equity
prices, and causing further banking weaknesses,
considering that a large proportion of bank
collateral is in shares.
Credit sector problems are appallingly widespread
in Asia and it is clear that this has had a large impact
on exchange rates. Japan, which is the most recent
contributor to the Asian crisis, has a credit sector
problem that undermines confidence in Japanese
savings being invested in yen assets. Addressing this
credit sector problem through a leisurely approach
to writing off losses has also required Japan to
maintain low domestic interest rates, which sustains
the incentive for Japanese savers to move out of
yen-denominated financial assets. If Japanese savers
cannot be converted into Japanese consumers4
overnight it is imperative all the more that Japanese
financial restructuring be completed quickly.
Historically a combination of a raid on taxpayers'
money and money creation has proved the most
forthright way to get out of a credit sector problem.
Normally, the size of the debt overhang cannot be
absorbed through private write-offs, even though
private write-offs are required to reduce the cost of
the operation, to increase the speed at which spe-
cific loan instruments are liquidated, and to restore
creditor confidence.5
In a democracy raiding taxpayers' money as Japan
and the Scandinavian countries found out, is not
There will be a period, unavoidably, in which the
government and government agencies will be holding
equity and participating in the management of financial
and industrial enterprises.
straightforward since it requires that sufficient pain
be inflicted on those who made hay during the
lending boom. Taxpayers have to be mollified with
the assurance that culprits in the lending boom are
contributing their share in accepting the losses and
being punished for their violations of the law
Arrests, bankruptcies, and in the case especially of
Japan, tragically, suicides are part of this process.6
Japan's experience since 1990 of reluctance and
inability to use the resources from these two sources
to resolve its financial instabilities is illustrative of
the kinds of controversies that are being replayed in
the other Asian economies. Add to this the IMF's
obsession (perhaps due to the IMP's informational
advantage in understanding how private currency
markets operate, a rather doubtful claim) with liq-
uidity restriction and high interest rates, and one
could argue that the process will be more
complicated in the other Asian countries.
With regard to money creation, a contrast with
regard to the stance of foreign cooperators to the
recovery program can be made. The Argentines
actually carried out significant money emission (to
use a Latin phraseology) to rescue the banking sys-
tem in response to the Tequila crisis. This is nor-
mally a 'no no' when running a currency board and
the Argentineans did claim that they were deter-
mined to maintain their system in the face of the
crisis. Argentina's friends in the international com-
munity, including the IMF and the private market,
apparently permitted Argentina the liquidity leeway
during the crisis, something that has proven very
difficult for the Thais and the Koreans to obtain
from the IMP
Moreover, exchange rate stability is indispensable
for the recapitalisation of the domestic credit sys-
tem; otherwise, it would be wise for residents to
hold their assets in foreign currencies. The
processes can feed into each other and at this junc-
ture it is critical for Japan to get its financial house
in order as quickly as possible.
What does the credit locus of the Asian problem
bode for the future? One would hope that Japan's
Raiding taxpayers' money was a politically possible
strategy in Latin America since government companies
had been involved and democracy was only a gleam in
the Latin eye when the debt crisis began. However, the
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long-running experience will not become the norm
in the other Asian economies.
3 Role of Internationalised Asset
Markets
The contrasting role of nationals, both resident and
non-resident, against those of non-natïonals pro-
vided some analytical edge to understanding Latin
currency attacks. Before the 1994 Mexican crisis, it
appeared, for example, that non-nationals contin-
ued to be optimistic about Mexico's medium-term
prospects while the nationals were quietly increas-
ing their assets outside of Mexico. The role of this
so-called 'heterogeneity of expectations' will
undoubtedly be the subject of formal study of the
Asian cases in the future.
During the 1980s Latin American crisis, capital
accounts had not been liberalised; however, that
crisis abounded with stories, economic models, and
estimates of capital flight and how wealthy Latin
Americans had moved their assets abroad and prof-
ited from the so-called maxi-devaluations. The
Asian economies have also carried out maxi-deval-
uations, but for the most part their capital accounts
are now widely open. In the case of Korea, its capi-
tal account has been drastically opened as part of its
IMP reform package. Since the crisis began in July
1997, attempts in Asia to make residents' purchases
of foreign assets illegal have only resulted in further
currency attacks, that is, capital flight.
Internationalised asset markets have played a key
role in the Asian crisis, as the currency crisis hop-
scotched its way through all the celebrated East
Asian economies. The 1994-95 Latin American cri-
sis had all the elements of these internationalised
asset markets. Argentina became the immediate vic-
tim of Mexican devaluation, in spite of the currency
board in place. Multinational banks cut their
domestic credit lines and Argentina experienced
colossal interest rates.
However, the contrast in the international response
to the Tequila crisis as opposed to the Tom Yum cri-
sis are quite stark. When the Mexican crisis began,
Latin Americans had limited taxpayers' resources to raid
just at the point when the crisis struck.
there was an immediate recognition of the
contagion problem and the possibility of an interna-
tional meltdown of financial markets. The US sup-
port for Mexico was swift, practically
unconditional, and large. Two memorable events of
1995 are worth noting. First, the whole outstanding
stock of tesobonos (short-term Mexican treasury
bills denominated in US dollars) had been wound
down by April 1995, using the funds provided from
the rescue package. Second, European executive
directors of the IMF were seen to have complained
about how the US had strong-armed the IMF into
providing a rescue package that bent the IMF rules
beyond recognition. European directors actually
abstained in the vote on the IMF package.
The swift, large, and mostly unconditional
international response to the Tequila crisis in 1995
prevented that crisis from creating widespread
banking crises in the countries subjected to cur-
rency attack. Currencies devalued and stopped
falling further. For Argentina, interest rates soared
and credit disappeared. For the affected economies,
there was a large drop in output, rapid nationalisa-
tion of financial losses (at relatively stable exchange
rates), and a normalisation after about one year.
The contrast with Asia is quite stark. The US did
not participate in the Thai package. In the
Indonesian case, successive, highly conditional, but
ultimately unsuccessful rescue programmes saw the
precipitous decline of the rupiah and undermined
banking and corporate solvency The Korean
programme is also highly conditional.
For all the economies, as we have described above,
the private sector nature and the credit-centredness
of the crisis complicate recovery, but it is also the
case that the continued uncertainty in exchange
rates complicates attempts to provide a basis for the
return of resident assets and to recapitalise the finan-
cial system. The currency instability has lasted quite
a long time in Asia. For the length of time since the
crises began, the Thai baht standard deviation is 55
per cent more than that of the Mexican peso. The fall
of the Japanese yen since November 1997 has added
its own volatility to the Asian currencies.
European banks had been playing catch-up with US
banks to increase their operations in the region, while
many US banks had been reducing their exposure.
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Undoubtedly charges that the US moved too
quickly in early 1995 to bail-out its own pension
funds explain part of the US hesitation in dealing
with the Asian crisis; US exposure to Asia was also
less than that of Japan and Europe.7 Only in
December, after a tour of the countries by US offi-
cials, did it appear that the US was taking the crisis
seriously. As explained earlier, the private sector
nature of the crisis might have also precluded a
quick Mexican style bail-out of private claims in the
region. But perhaps this would have been a con-
juncture in which currency support and interven-
tion might have been appropriate.8
By October/November 1998, the Asian crisis could
be interpreted as a liquidity crisis, akin to a bank-
run in domestic contexts where most of the bank-
ing system is still thought to be solvent, brought
about by the sudden demand of Asian residents for
US dollars in the face of uncertainty over how low
currency values would fall. There was a dollar
shortage in the region that was forcing currency val-
ues to fall quite out of line with what would have
been required to restore external balance. Exchange
rates, having fallen so much, had been transformed
for most Asian economies from being a 'symptom'
to being a cause of further domestic financial
instability
What appears to be called for to stabilise the
situation is (1) for the G7 countries, especially the
US, to prevent any further depreciation of the yen
and (2) for the Asian countries, using funds mostly
raised from Japanese guarantees and applying
American conditionality, to implement an exchange
rate stabilisation arrangement. With regard to the
first, private markets have been waiting for this
move since before the G7 finance ministers' meeting
in Birmingham in late February Almost everyone
knew Japan was about to go into recession, almost
everyone knew the constraints of the Japanese
political cycle, and that Japan had scheduled its Big
Bang for 1 April 1998.
The impact of the US intervention at the end of
June highlights the prickly and information-driven
8 Some of these arguments are also made by McKinnon
(1998) in a paper presented at the annual meetings of
the American Economic Society
nature of exchange markets9 and the importance of
a steady stance in exchange stabilisation, at least
until the crisis subsides. After the intervention, the
yen fell, ahead of an emergency meeting of G7
deputy finance ministers and their Asian counter-
parts in Tokyo on 20 June 1998. This contrasts with
the situation immediately preceding the three pre-
vious G7-related meetings. One could ask whether,
after three experiences, currency markets associated
these meetings with a 'no intervention' strategy
Efforts by the US Treasury Secretary in a public
interview to dampen expectations from the Tokyo
meeting were a key element; that these efforts had
to be made to avert an over-strengthening of the yen
followed by an over-correction which would have
required more intervention indicates the hair-
trigger nature of the problem.
With regard to the second element, there had been
a $100 billion proposal in September 1997 to help
stabilise Asian currencies, but this had been slapped
down by the US and the IMF out of feelings of inse-
curity and because they had not partícpated in the
proposal. Currency markets in the developing
countries in Asia are quite thin and susceptible to
intervention. It remains for the US to agree on the
conditionalities under which this fund, which can
be raised through Japan, would be used.
The question remains as to why the US might find
it in its interest, as it seems to have done in the
Tequila crisis, to play a more active and sympathetic
role. Here I borrow the arguments from McKinnon
(1998). The US has virtually unlimited access to the
international credit markets, as governments and
central banks flock to US bonds and financial
assets. But as it is also the prime issuer of interna-
tional liquidity, it might find it in its interest to
make sure that the liquidity crises do not cause the
world payments to seize up and, ultimately, that the
meltdown in the Asian economies does not affect its
own economic performance. US politicians can be
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told that the US is already borrowing hugely from
abroad and extracting significant seignorage. Its
support for the yen would constitute a partial
return of the international liquidity that its econ-
omy is now withdrawing from the rest of the world.
McKinnon (1998, p.7) actually says that 'the US has
a moral imperative - as well as its own economic
interests - at stake in acting effectively as the lender
of last resort.'
Without exchange stabilisation, financial market
rehabilitation will be problematic in Asia. Without
financial market recovery there can be little eco-
nomic growth. Without reasonable prospects for
economic growth, financial companies will remain
weak and investment cannot recover. In the 1980s'
Latin American crisis, it was the excruciating recov-
ery of investment that caused the so-called 'L-
shaped' recovery. In order to get out of the slump,
strong public interventions were required - notably
the Brady bond write-offs and the set of structural
adjustment programmes. Without strong public
interventions, but of a different sort as I have
pointed out above, Asia faces the prospect of a slow
and reversal-prone recovery.
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